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RIGHTS WITHOUT MEANING: FAILING TO GIVE
EFFECT TO THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 15(1)
LAURA FRASERt

The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Egan v. Canada 1
has resulted in significant controversy and unanswered questions
surrounding the status of homosexual couples. Egan has also raised
doubts as to the status of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms2 section 15(1) analysis first announced in Andrews v. Law
3
Society ofBritish Columbia and later expanded in R. v. Turpin. 4
Egan was released concurrently with Miron v. Trudef5 and
Thibaudeau v. Canada. 6 All three cases in the trilogy dealt with
alleged breaches of section 15 (1). Because of the peculiar
combination of Supreme Court Justices who supported the new
approach, lower courts in subsequent discrimination cases have been
inconsistently applying section 15(1). While most courts have
followed the established Andrews test (endorsed McLachlin J. and
three others in the trilogy), other lower courts have combined
elements of the Andrews test with the new analysis. Others still have
adopted the new analysis outright. In the resulting uncertainty,
lower courts have reflected the lack of consensus on the proper
approach to a section 15 ( 1) analysis, and unfortunately may have
assessed discrimination on the basis of reaching a desired outcome.
These results have necessitated clear direction from the Supreme
Court on section 15(1).

t B.Comm. (Alberta), LLB. anticipated 1998.
1

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (hereinafter Egan).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (u.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter].
3
[1989] l S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews].
4
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 [hereinafter Turpin].
5 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 [hereinafter Miron].
6 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.
2
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I. THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO SECTION 15(1)
Andrews is the traditional starting point for a section 15(1) analysis.
Where earlier cases had consistently held that any distinction made
by the government was an infringement,7 Andrews introduced a
measuring stick against which allegedly discriminatory laws could
8
be gauged. The Court concluded that there were two criteria
which had to be met in order for a Charter challenge to be
successful: first, a breach of one of the four inequalities must have
occurred and second, this breach of equality must have occurred
with discrimination. This was taken from the section's text which
reads:
15 (1) Every individual is equal before the and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.

In discussing how to assess a breach of equality the court
rejected the "similarly situated test" found in previous case law9 in
10
favour of a promotion of equality approach. Mcintyre J., writing
for the majority on this issue, stated:
It is clear that the purpose of s.15 is to ensure equality in
the formulation and application of the law. The
promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society
in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are
recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of
concern, respect and consideration. It has a large
remedial component. 11

7 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at
904.
8
Ibid. at 904.
9
See e.g. Reference re Family Benefits Act (NS.) (1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338 at 351
(N.S.S.C. A.D.); Smith Klien & French Laboratories Ltd. v. A.G. of Canada (1986),
34 D.L.R. (4th) 584 at 590 (F.C.A.).
10
Supra note 3. At 163-171, Mcintyre J. discusses the abstract views of equality
in an attempt to determine exactly what kind of equality the Charter was
attempting to protect. He rejects equality of application to similarly situated
groups (at 168) in favour of the promotion of equality approach (at 171).
11
Supra note 3 at 171.
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Mcintyre J. further stressed the importance of the second
component of section 15(1), the "discrimination" component,
stating that the rights contained in this section "are granted with
the direction in s.15 itself that they be without discrimination." 12
He then went on to define what this means:
I would say then that discrimination may be described as
a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on
grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual
or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or
limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society. 13

The analysis undertaken by Mcintyre J. in developing a section
15 analysis reflects the purposive approach to interpretation of
Charter rights heralded by Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug
Mart Ltd. as the approach which should be taken by the courts
when interpreting Charter rights:
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the
Charter [is] to be ascertained by an analysis of the
purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to be understood, in
other words, in the light of the interests [it is] meant to
protect. 14

As Professor Hogg explains, the purposive approach involves:
[A]n attempt to ascertain the purpose of each Charter
right, and then to interpret the right so as to include
activity that comes within the purpose and exclude
activity that does not ... some guidance can be obtained
from the language in which the right is expressed, from
the implications to be drawn from the context in which
the right is to be found .... 15

With respect to the "language in which the right is expressed,"
L'Heureux-Dube J. in Egan stated, "as an important starting point
to evaluating the purpose of section 15 (I), we need to look no

12

13

14

15

supra note 3 at 172.
Ibid. at 174.
(1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344.

Supra note 7 at 625.
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further than its text." She then went on to discuss the second
element expressed by Professor Hogg namely, the context in which
17
the right is to be found. This interpretation of the purposive
approach accords with the Supreme Court's decision in Turpin,
where context was seen as a necessary consideration in any
evaluation of discrimination. Wilson J. discussed this point:
In determining whether there is discrimination on
grounds relating to the personal characteristics of the
individual or group, it is important to look not only at
the impugned legislation which has created a distinction
that violates the right to equality but also to the larger
social, political and legal context.... Accordingly, it is
only by examining the larger context that a court can
determine whether a differential treatment results in
equality or whether, contrariwise, it would be identical
treatment which would in the particular context result in
inequality or foster disadvantage. 18

While warning that "s.15 analysis may become a mechanical and
sterile categorization process conducted entirely within four corners
19
of the impugned legislation,'' Wilson J. stressed the importance of
a contextual approach to section 15, interpreted by Lessard et al. as
one where "the individual ... was situated in and only understood
20
in reference to the larger social groupings and contexts." It is this
consideration of context in Turpin, coupled with the original
Andrews test, which subsequent jurisprudence seems to have
adopted when assessing whether discrimination under section 15(1)
21
has occurred. As Lamer C.J.C. summarizes in R. v. Swain:
The court must first determine whether a claimant has
shown that one of the four basic equality rights has been
denied .... This inquiry will focus largely on whether the
law has drawn a distinction (intentionally or otherwise)
between the claimant and others, based on personal

16

Supra note 1 at 541.
Ibid. at 542.
18
Supra note 4 at 1331-2.
19
Ibid. at 1332.
17

20

H. Lessard et al. "Deveiopments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Term"
(1995) Sup. Ct. LR. 81at87.
21
[1991] l S.C.R. 933.

RIGHTS WITHOUT MEANING

351

characteristics. Next, the court must determine whether
the denial can be said to result in 'discrimination.' This
second inquiry will focus largely on whether the
differential treatment has the effect of imposing a
burden, obligation or disadvantage not imposed upon
others or of withholding or limiting access to
opportunities, benefits and advantages available to others.
Furthermore, in determining whether the claimant's
s.15 (1) rights have been infringed, the court must
consider whether the personal characteristic in question
falls within an analogous ground, so as to ensure that the
claim fits within the overall purpose of s.15-namely, to
remedy or prevent discrimination against groups subject
to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and
social prejudice in Canadian society. 22

In Egan this consideration of the section's purpose and its
contextual background runs afoul when four of the nine Supreme
Court Justices consider, in addition, the relevance of the distinction
made to the impugned legislation.
II. EGAN v. CANADA: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
James Egan and his partner John Nesbitt had been in a homosexual
relationship since 1948. They were in what Cory J. described as an
"intimate" and "mutually supportive" relationship, sharing bank
23
accounts, credit cards and property.
Egan turned sixty-five on October 1st, 1986, and became
eligible to receive old age security and a guaranteed income
supplement, pursuant to provisions of the Old Age Security Act. 24
The Act also provided for a spousal allowance to be paid to the
spouse of the pensioner when that spouse was between sixty and
sixty-five years of age and the couple's combined income fell below
a fixed level. When Nesbitt turned sixty, he applied for this benefit,
describing Egan as his spouse. His application was rejected by the
Department of National Health and Welfare on the basis that Egan

Ibid. at 992.
supra note 1 at 577.
24
OldAgeSecuri-tyAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9.
22
23
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and Nesbitt did not share a spousal relationship as contemplated in
the Act. Section 2 of the Act provided:
'Spouse,' in relation to any person, includes a person of
the opposite sex who is living with that person, having
lived with that person for at least one year, if the two
persons have publicly represented themselves as husband
and wife ....

Egan and Nesbitt brought an action in the Federal Court,
arguing that this definition of spouse discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation and so contravened section 15 (1) of the Charter.
They also sought a declaration to expand the definition to include
"partners in same-sex relationships otherwise akin to conjugal
relationships." 25 The Trial Division dismissed the claim, 26 as did the
Federal Court of Appeal with the exception of Linden J.A. who, in
dissent, found a section 15(1) infringement that could not be
justified under section 1.27
At the Supreme Court, Lamer C.J.C., La Forest, Major, and
Gonthier, JJ. dismissed the appeal on the basis that section 2 of the
Old Age Security Act did not infringe section 15 (I), and added,
without explanation, that the impugned legislation would be
justified under section 1 even if it had been discriminatory. Sopinka
J. also dismissed the appeal, but on the basis that section 2 infringed
section 15(1) and was justified under section 1. Cory, L'HeureuxDube, Iacobucci, and McLachlin JJ., would have allowed the appeal
finding an infringement that was not justified by section 1.
Although representing the majority in the outcome, the four
justices led by La Forest ]. were a minority with respect to the
section 15(1) analysis. By establishing a test without regard to the
wording of section 15 (I) or the appropriate social and historical
context, their decision represents a significant departure from
previous Charter jurisprudence.

2s

26
27

Supra note 1 at 578.
(1992), 87 D.L.R. (4th) 320.
(1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 336.
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III. DEVIATION FROM PRECEDENT:
FORGETTING THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 15

The minority led by La Forest J. based its decision on the
unprecedented section 15 (1) analysis released concurrently in
Miron. Gonthier J. wrote what could be regarded as the original
new test cited and applied by La Forest J. in Egan:
The analysis to be undertaken under s.15 (1) of the
Charter involves three steps. The first step looks to
whether the law has drawn a distinction between the
claimant and others. The second step then questions
whether the distinction results in disadvantage, and
examines whether the impugned law imposes a burden,
obligation or disadvantage on a group of persons to
which the claimant belongs which is not imposed on
others, or does not provide them with a benefit which it
grants others .... It is at this second step that the direct
or indirect effect of the legislation is examined.
The third step assesses whether the distinction is based on an
irrelevant personal characteristic which is either enumerated
in section 15(1) or one analogous thereto . ... This third
step comprises two aspects: determining the personal
characteristic shared by a group and then assessing its
relevancy having regard to the functional values underlying
the legislation. [emphasis added]2 8

Lessard et al. interpret this new analysis as a strong rejection of
earlier jurisprudence and in rsarticular the previous focus on the
"contextualized individual." 9 They argue that this test bears no
conceptual link to the enumerated or analogous grounds approach
in Andrews as well as the pre-existing group context of disadvantage
that approach required. I would agree, as it cannot be said that this
test accords with the purposive approach, either literally or
conceptually.
Literally, there is no clear mention of relevance in section 15(1)
or in the definition of discrimination outlined in Andrews and

28
29

Supra note 5 at 435-6.
Supra note 20 at 90.
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30
adopted in subsequent cases. The new analysis also disregards a
contextual approach to determining legislative purpose. As noted
by Lessard et al., Gonthier J. does acknowledge the importance of
context in discrimination cases:
[C]ontext is indispensable in helping to determine
whether a given basis of distinction is a discriminatory
ground for certain classes of cases but not for others. 31

But as Lessard et al. state, this is "no more than an obligatory nod
to past jurisprudential warnings about the aridity of
decontextualized analysis."3 2 They further claim that "Justice
Gonthier [in Miron] did not allow the larger social and historical
pattern of Canadian society to enter into his analysis-although this
33
is ... the context to which past judgments allude;" instead,
Gonthier J. in Miron (and La Forest J. in Egan) conduct an
"examination of the statute with a view to determining the
34
functional values of the law." And, as these authors warn, this is
the very context which section 15 aims to protect in the first place:
The result is that Gonthier J. 's test frames the equality
issues at stake in terms of the very contexts-those of
'traditional values' and 'common sense'-that equality
theory at its best must challenge. After all, it has been
traditional values ... which have left us our rich legacy of
discrimination .... [T]he context that shapes and
constrains Gonthier J.' s analysis is precisely the context
that a rigorous equality analysis demands be scrutinized35

30

See D. Gibson, "Analogous Grounds of Discrimination Under the Charter:
Too Much Ado About Next to Nothing" infra note 45 at 780-781.
31
Supra note 20 at 91. See further, Gonthier J.'s analysis of the contextual
approach in Miron, supra note 5 at 437-40.
32 Supra note 20 at 91.
33
Ibid. at 91. They note also that Gonthier J. actually rejects an analysis of social
and historical context to enter into a determination of discrimination when it is
stated [at 91] that "membership in such a disadvantaged group is not an essential
precondition for bringing a claim under section 15 of the Charter." Further, "[t]o
the extent that such context of disadvantage is relevant, it is only as an indication that
the distinction in question drawn on the basis of an irrelevant personal
characteristic."
34
Ibid. at 91.
35
Ibid. at 91.
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The Miron test, and specifically its element of relevancy, is also
out of line conceptually with a section 15 (1) analysis, being more in
accordance with the rational connection component of the section 1
36
analysis established in R. v. Oakes. This may be inferred from
Gonthier J.'s own reasons:
[T]he analysis under s. 15 of the Charter encompasses a
determination as to whether the prejudicial distinction is
attributable to or on the basis of an enumerated or
analogous ground. Such a ground is identified as one that
is commonly used to make distinctions which have little
or no rational connection with the subject matter,
generally reflecting a stereotype. [emphasis added]3 7

There has been much discussion concerning the overlap of the
Miron test with the section 1 analysis but this was not intended to
38
be the focus of this comment. However, given Gonthier J.'s
explanation of the role of relevancy in the section 15 (1) analysis, it
is clear that such a consideration accords more with a section 1
analysis than with a search for discrimination under section 15. As
such, the usefulness of the purposive approach is strengthened when
one considers the following comment by Professor Hogg:
The purposive approach ... works in perfect harmony
with the stringent standard of justification under s.l.
Once a right has been confined to its purpose, it seems
obvious that a government ought to have to satisfy a
stringent standard of justification to uphold legislation
39
limiting the right.

By not considering the wording or context of section 15,
Gonthier J., writing for the section 15(1) minority in Egan, failed to
consider both the purpose of section 15 and the harmony that a
section 15 analysis should have with section 1.

36

[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.

37
38

Supra note 5 at 441.
In Andrews, supra note 3, Mcintyre

J. gave careful consideration to the
interaction between sections 15(1) and 1 at 177-8 and again at 182-3. For greater
discussion see also ]. Keene, "Discrimination in the provision of government
services and s.15 of the Charter: Making the Best of] udgments in Egan and Miron"
(1995) 11 J. L. & Social Pol'y at 158-163.
39
Supra note 7 at 626.
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IV. THE BASIS FOR RELEVANCE
The section 15(1) minorities in Egan and Miron did not elaborate
on the purpose of the section as the basis for assessing relevancy,
asserting throughout their reasons that they were adopting the test
4
outlined in Andrews. ° Further support was found in an article by
Professor Dale Gibson. 41 With respect to Mcintyre J.'s comments,
the importance of relevancy was extracted from the following:
In other words, the admittedly unattainable ideal [of
equality] should be that a law expressed to bind all
should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a
more burdensome or less beneficial impact on one than
the other. [emphasis added] 42

Gonthier and La Forest JJ. argue that Mcintyre J., in this
statement, was trying to emphasize a qualification which the courts
should keep in mind in assessing when an individual's right to
equality under the Charter has been violated. As Gonthier J. states:
My concern [with using relevance] has only been to
clarify a qualification which must be made in the
application of the analogous grounds approach, a
qualification which merely calls for a heightened
sensitivity to the nature of the ground in issue in any
given case, and a recognition that a ground which may be
the basis of discrimination in one context may be
innocuous in another. 43

It may be argued, however, that Mcintyre J. did not intend
such emphasis be placed on relevance. If he had, it is likely that such
a limitation to an individual's equality rights would have been
discussed in greater detail as the section 15 (1) test was developed
For example, Mcintyre J. specifically outlines certain factors which
must be considered when resolving equality questions under the
Charter:

40

Supra note 3. In Miron, supra note 5 at 442, Gonthier]. also states: "I should
also emphasize that the approach to s.15 in these reasons in no way departs from this
court's approach in Andrews . .. and in subsequent jurisprudence."
41 "Analogous Grounds of Discrimination under the Canadian Charter: Too
Much Ado About Next to Nothing" (1991) 29 Alta. L.Rev. 772.
42
Supra note 3 at 165.
43
Supra note 5 at 442.
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[T]he test cannot be accepted as a fixed rule or formula
for the resolution of equality arising under the Charter.
Consideration must be given to the content of the law, to its
purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and
also upon those whom it excludes from its application. The
issues which arise from case to case are such that it would
be wrong to attempt to confine these considerations
within such a fixed and limited formula. [emphasis
added] 44

The importance of not reducing the section 15 (1) analysis to
one formula has been recognized in post-Andrews jurisprudence.
But it is clear from this statement and throughout Mcintyre J.'s
decision that relevancy was not a consideration intended to play a
part in the section 15 ( 1) analysis, especially since relevance has
already been shown to play a stronger role in the section 1
. 45
ana1ys1s.
Gonthier J. drew further support from Professor Gibson's
argument in "Analogous Grounds of Discrimination under the
46
Canadian Charter: Too Much Ado About Next to Nothing,"
stating that the ingredient of the relevancy of the personal
characteristic went to the "essential core" of the Supreme Court's
section 15(1) jurisprudence.47 In the same article, however, Gibson
also states that the discrimination analysis is one defined by "those
differences which cannot be reasonably justified in the particular
context" [emphasis added]. 48 Taking the term "justified" literally,
it seems as though credence is further laid to the proposition that a
relevancy analysis is not in accordance with the test for equality
under section 15 ( 1), but better placed under section 1 where the
onus is properly on the state to "justify" why a particular distinction
.
was made '"m any given
context. ,,49

Supra note 3 at 168.
An analysis which Mcintyre]. himself emphasized as one which should remain
separate from the section 15(1) test when evaluating a case of discrimination under
the Charter. See Andrews, supra note 3 at 177-8.
46
Supra note 41.
47
Supra note 5 at 436.
48
Supra note 41.
49
As Mcintyre]. stressed in Andrews, supra note 3 at 178:
44
45

The court has described the analytical approach to the Charter in
R. v. Oakes ... and other cases, the essential feature of which is
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V. LOWER COURT DECISIONS AFTER EGAN:
FUTURE DIRECTIONS?

Some lower courts in Canada have adopted and applied the new
analysis from Egan and Miron, leaving the law surrounding section
15 (1) uncertain. Given the different approaches to section 15 (1) in
50
these cases, many lower court decisions have either applied one of
these tests or both, claiming that the decision would remain the
same under each. As Charron J. states in Rosenberg v. Canada
(A.G.):
[I]t is debatable whether courts of inferior jurisdiction, in
a subsequent case ... are bound by the finding made by
five of the nine justices on the s.15(1) issue since only one
of these five justices formed part of the ultimate majority
51
who governed the final outcome of the case.

In the end, Charron J. adopts the two step Andrews analysis:
[W]hen one considers Egan v. Canada in combination
with Miron v. Trudel, it is clear that by majority ruling
the Supreme Court has adopted a two-step analysis to
the question of s.15 discrimination.5 2

This result seems logical when one considers that a total of five
of the nine Justices adopted the original test in both Egan and
53
Miron. Nevertheless, other decisions have interpreted Egan and
Miron as representative of the Supreme Court's uncertainty around
a section 15(1) Charter analysis. For example, Hutchinson J.A. m
Griggv. British Columbia states:
[T]he apparent divergence in approach is yet unsettled
and no real consensus emerges from a reading and
analysis of the trilogy. Both Miron and Egan illustrate the
difficulty lower courts must face under s.15 challenges as
that the right guaranteeing sections be kept analytically separate
from section 1 .... It is for the citizen to establish that his or her
Charter right has been infringed and for the state to justifjt the
inftingement. [emphasis added]
50
L'Heureux-Dube J. also presented a slightly different approach in Egan but
her analysis has not resulted in any substantial departure from precedent. See
Thibaudeau v. Canada, supra note 6 at 640.
51
(1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 612 at 620 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafrer RosenberiJ.
52 Supra note 2 at 620.
53
Aside from the slight departure in L'Heureux-Dube J.'s decision.
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either majority approach could be utilized to arrive at a
54
desired result. [emphasis added]

This analysis can be validated in light of those cases which
denied an equality claim under the Charter on the basis that the
distinction made by Parliament was relevant to the purpose the
impugned legislation was trying to achieve. See for example,
55
Tinkham v. Canada and Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
56
Canada where the new analysis in Egan was cited as the "principle
majority judgment" to deny equality claims to complainants. 57
Other courts under section 15 have simply been confused by
the new analysis and have opted to follow the traditional approach.
For example, in Human Rights Commission (Nfld.) et al. v.
Newfoundland (Minister of Employment and Labour Relations), Barry
J. stated:
On the issue of whether this Court must consider if the
distinction made by Parliament is relevant to the
functional values underlying the law, with respect, I am
unable to understand the point made by Gonthier J. in
Miron ... that, even where a distinction is based on an
irrelevant personal characteristic, it may still be rationally
connected to a pressing and substantial governmental
objective. I prefer the view ... that relevance should
come into the analysis of whether there is a justification
under section 1 for the distinction drawn by the law.
Otherwise the courts will be returning to the
'reasonableness' theory of discrimination rejected in
Andrews ... .58

Barry J.'s comments were cited by Epstein J. of the Ontario General
Division Court in M v. H where she further added that the
determination of relevancy is "more appropriately dealt with in the
. ,,59
s. 1 an alys1s.
54

[1996] B.C.J. No. 1869 (C.A.) (QL.).
(1995), 16 B.C.L.R. (3d) 79 (S.C.).
56
(1996), 18 B.C.L.R. (3d) 241 (S.C.).
57
Ibid. at 279 as per Smith]. See further, Olsonv. Canada (1996), 107 F.T.R. 81
and NB. (Minister of Health & Community Services) v. G.(].) (1996), 131 D.L.R.
(4th) 273 (N.B.Q.B.), where the new test in Egan and Miron was directly applied to
deny the plaintiffs claims.
58 (1995), 134 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 66 at 82 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.).
59
(1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 593 at 604 (Gen. Div.).
55
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As in Rosenberg, much of the lower court jurisprudence has held
that the two part Andrews analysis is the proper measuring stick
with which to gauge a case of discrimination under section 15(1)
and further verifies that this test properly gives effect to the
purposes underlying the section. In Mohammed v. Metro Toronto,
for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
Ultimately, therefore, the question which must be
addressed under [the enumerated and analogous
grounds] approach is whether the distinction has a
prejudicial effect on the individual or group in light of
s.15' s fundamental purpose ... I agree with the
comments of McLachlin and Cory in Miron ... and
Egan ... that the concept of relevance is more properly
60
considered under s. l.

It should be noted, however, that these decisions also qualify their
approach by stating that the result would have been the same in
each case had either section 15(1) analysis been used.
In light of these decisions it is difficult to determine where the
law will go with respect to the appropriate analysis under section
15(1) of the Charter. It is clear, however, that the law is unsettled
and will continue to be until the Supreme Court of Canada has had
an opportunity to rectify these interpretations of its decisions in
Egan and Miron.

60

(1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 108 (C.A.).

